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Abstract 
 
Data privacy is a topic of interest for researchers, 
data collection managers, and data system specialists. 
To assuage growing concerns regarding the collection 
and use of personal data, many organizations have 
begun developing systems and drafting policies meant 
to safeguard that data from potential privacy harms. 
This paper provides a surface-level comparison of 
data privacy triads from NIST in the United States and 
ULD in Germany that may form the basis for a future 
universal definition of data privacy. The analysis 
shows two different approaches for defining data 
privacy: one which focuses on the practical 
implementation of data privacy safeguards (NIST) and 
one that focuses on defining the highest possible 
standards to which data processors must be held 
(ULD).  
 
1. Introduction  
 
    In January of this year, security experts discovered a 
massive security breach: a collection of 772 million 
unique emails and 21 million unique passwords [1]. 
These types of massive breaches are occurring more 
frequently, resulting in increased public and industry 
pressure to safeguard the privacy of users. While there 
are established standards related to security, privacy 
controls in the U.S. are still under development.  
    One thing holding back privacy is that a generally 
accepted and well-formed definition of data privacy 
(and, thus, that which must be protected) has not yet 
been developed. The purpose of this paper is to analyze 
two potential ontological definitions for data privacy 
while also providing recommendations to produce 
stronger definitions in the future. Without an agreed-to 
definition, how can data privacy standards, tools, and 
solutions be developed?  Would a vendor-developed 
tool be missing an important component of data 
privacy? Would privacy assessors and auditors have 
incomplete standards from which to model after?  
    Information security is commonly understood to be 
made up of confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
This shared understanding of the definition of security 
allows vendors to build tools that can be consistently 
utilized by all organizations, regardless of culture, 
nationality, size and mission. Since data privacy 
currently lacks a standard definition, vendors run the 
risk of developing privacy standards, frameworks, 
checklists and tools which are fundamentally 
incomplete, ineffectual, or even harmful to the 
organizations that use them. This concern of continuing 
with a fractured understanding of data privacy begs the 
question of what actions standard-setting bodies have 
taken when it comes to formally defining the issue. 
    Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz 
Schleswig-Holstein (ULD) is a data protection 
authority based in Kiel, Germany that advises data 
processors on data privacy-related issues. In 2015, the  
ULD published “Protection Goals for Privacy 
Engineering” as part of the IEEE CS Security and 
Privacy Workshops. In this report, the ULD defines six 
protection goals organized as a set of three axes. These 
three axes form their so-called Six-Pointed Star and 
form the basis of their ontology [43].  
    The National Institute of Standards and Technology 
is a United States Department of Commerce institute 
that supports American scientific innovation and 
industrial competitivity. In NIST Internal Report 8062, 
NIST introduced a data privacy framework to assist in 
the development of systems that better protect the 
privacy of those whose data is collected, stored, and 
retained in those systems. This document first appeared 
as a draft in January of 2015 before being published in 
April of 2017 with the intent to “establish the basis for 
a common vocabulary to facilitate better understanding 
and communication of privacy risk within federal 
systems, and the effective implementation of privacy 
principles” [2].  
    The remainder of this paper is as follows: section 2 
contains a literature review regarding current data 
security and data privacy issues, section 3 details 
background information regarding the two frameworks 
being compared, section 4 contains the actual 
comparison and analysis of the ontologies, section 5 
contains the conclusions reached as a result of the 
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comparison, and section 6 contains recommendations 
for future research regarding this topic.   
 
2. Literature Review  
 
    Data breaches affected more than one billion people 
in 2018 [3]. In fact, reports demonstrate that data 
breaches of electronic health records are occurring on 
an unprecedented scale with half of the US population 
compromised [4]. Many annual data security studies 
exist examining the cybersecurity field [5-10]. Data 
breaches continue, and hackers consider data security 
big business.  
    Privacy breaches are also on the rise with data 
privacy becoming big business for hackers [11, 12]. 
Unfortunately, the Internet of Things (IoT) promises to 
magnify the number of privacy breaches [13]. With an 
ever-interconnected world, data privacy is an 
international issue [14-16]. Cambridge Analytica went 
into bankruptcy protection after their data handling 
practices came to light [17, 18]. Like the path of data 
security, the path of data privacy is being spearheaded 
by scandals, breaches, and international concern. 
    Consequently, data privacy is becoming a hot topic 
in business today [19-21]. At the U.S. federal level, 
NIST has created several “Security and Privacy” 
publications that address privacy assessments, privacy 
frameworks, and tips for privatizing technical 
environments [22-25]. Facebook has announced an 
enormous restructuring [26] and a change in strategy 
putting privacy at the center of their strategy [27]. But 
a simple question exists: what is data privacy? What 
constitutes data privacy? The world is creating privacy 
methods and tools to protect privacy [28], working to 
integrate privacy and technology [29], and has 
outlined key activities which must occur to keep a 
digital investigation private [30]. Diversity studies are 
completed to understand demographics behind good 
and poor privacy [31]. However, the reality is that the 
world pushed ahead with creating a plethora of 
privacy frameworks, tools, and solutions before it 
developed a universal understanding of what data 
privacy is [32, 33].   
    When it comes to privacy, however, most of the 
research done has been based on defining it in a legal 
or philosophic sense and, while these definitions are 
powerful, they do not define data privacy in the way 
the CIA triad defines data security [34]; [35]; [36]; 
[37]. A great deal of research and development has 
been conducted to define data security. From these 
efforts came a fairly universal understanding and the 
development of the CIA Triad [38]. The CIA triad 
highlights confidentiality, integrity and availability as 
the three primary goals of data security [39]. Because 
of this agreed-to definition, lawmakers, security 
professionals and policymakers all understand that 
data security is comprised of confidentiality, integrity 
and availability. Vendors can create solutions which 
address all three important goals.  
    While data security has much work to keep ahead 
of the bad guys, the definition is firm, and solutions 
can be developed and operationalized. When new 
technologies emerge (such as machine learning and 
artificial intelligence), these technologies can be 
targeted to all the characteristics of a triad (in the case 
of data security to the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability characteristics). 
    Data privacy does not have an agreed-to definition, 
so organizations run the risk of incomplete data 
privacy. Data privacy is considered a thornier issue 
than data security [40]; consequently, many 
policymakers simply avoid defining data privacy [33]. 
Many are putting their heads in the sand, but during a 
crisis, privacy and personal integrity issues can 
sometimes be overlooked [41]. Similar to data 
security, data privacy must be baked into 
organizational business processes [42]. As such, NIST 
has developed a series of publications to assist 
decision-makers and implementors with privacy 
processes and safeguards [22-25]. With no shared 
agreement of the key aspects that must be considered 
when developing systems and protocols to protect 
privacy, it is time to analyze those that are breaking 
ground in this area to move toward an understanding 
of a possible data privacy triad. 
 
3. Background 
 
A. The ULD Star   
 
 
 
Figure 1 – The ULD six-pointed star 
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    The ULD is a European government organization 
that specializes in privacy. Since the European Union 
is at the bleeding edge of privacy protections with 
their recent General Data Protection Regulation, it is 
reasonable to use a framework from a German data 
protection authority as a representative framework for 
many international communities. The three axes of the 
Six-Pointed Star include Confidentiality versus 
Availability, Integrity versus Intervenability, and 
Transparency versus Unlinkability [43]. 
    Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability are taken 
directly from the CIA security triad. The inclusion of 
the security triad objectives within the privacy structure 
highlights that, while security is an important 
component of privacy, it should be considered a subset 
of privacy. The additional aspects of privacy included 
by ULD are Intervenability, Transparency, and 
Unlinkability, which are defined by the ULD in the 
same publication.  
    Unlinkability is “the property that privacy-relevant 
data cannot be linked across domains that are 
constituted by a common purpose and context” [43]. If 
unlinkability is a priority, it should be nigh-impossible 
to link any information gathered to any information 
outside of the privacy system’s domain. The ULD 
claims that “the most effective method for unlinkability 
is data avoidance” [43]. One should only collect, 
process, and store data when absolutely necessary. 
    Transparency is “the property that all privacy-
relevant data processing… can be understood and 
reconstructed at any time” [43]. Anything a data 
processing system does regarding the collection, 
processing, storage, or future planned processing 
should be understood and reproducible by those using 
the system and those running the system.  
    Intervenability is “the property that intervention is 
possible concerning all ongoing or planned privacy-
relevant data processing” [43]. Specifically, the report 
states, the data subjects themselves should be able to 
intervene with regards to the processing of their own 
data. This, according to the ULD, is a way of ensuring 
that data subjects have the ability to control how their 
data is processed and by whom. 
 
B. The NIST Triad  
 
    The NIST privacy objectives, as defined in NISTIR 
8062: An Introduction to Privacy Engineering and Risk 
Management in Federal Systems, is an effort to provide 
“more guidance on privacy engineering processes, 
including the assessment of privacy risk” [2] and 
supplement the FIPPs (Fair Information Practice 
Principles) defined in US government’s Circular A-130 
document [44]. The document lists a set of three 
privacy objectives meant to be data privacy’s version of 
the CIA triad. These objectives are predictability, 
manageability, and disassociability. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – The NISTIR 8062 privacy objectives 
 
    Predictability is defined as “enabling reliable 
assumptions by individuals, owners, and operators 
about PII (Personally Identifiable Information) and its 
processing by an information system” [2]. This 
objective, according to NIST, helps to ensure the FIPPs 
of Accountability, Authority, Purpose Specification and 
Use Limitation, and Transparency. To summarize the 
definition, predictability is the notion that those 
interacting with the system (whether they be operating 
or using it) has the ability to make reasonable 
assumptions about how the system handles PII. While 
this objective does encourage transparency, it does not 
require complete transparency. It simply aims to ensure 
that anyone using the system is not surprised by how it 
handles data.  
    Manageability is defined as “providing the capability 
for granular administration of PII including alteration, 
deletion, and selective disclosure” [2]. The FIPPs of 
Accountability, Minimization, Quality and Integrity, 
and Individual Participation are supported by 
Manageability, according to NIST. By way of 
manageability, those who process PII are able to ensure 
the accuracy of data and the prompt removal of 
obsolete information, while also ensuring that only 
necessary information is collected and disclosed. 
Manageability does not, however, state that all 
individuals should have “the right to control their 
information, although it could enable a system 
capability to implement that policy” [2]. This 
distinction is made because some systems handle 
information about data subjects that the subjects should 
not be allowed to change, such as tax information 
handled by the IRS.  
    Disassociability is defined as “enabling the 
processing of PII or events without association to 
individuals or devices beyond the operation 
requirements of the system” [2]. This objective helps to 
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supplement two FIPPs: Accountability and 
Minimization, according to NIST. In essence, this 
objective aims to ensure that systems protect data 
subjects from the unnecessary exposure of PII: data 
should be disassociated from the subjects the data 
comes from whenever possible. NIST does not, 
however, claim that disassociability and anonymity are 
equivalent. Namely, NIST states that “agencies may opt 
to knowingly accept the risk [of exposure], or select 
controls that require an acceptance of greater residual 
risk…” Unlike confidentiality, which is focused on 
preventing unauthorized access to information, 
disassociability recognizes that privacy risks can result 
from exposures even within an authorized perimeter.  
 
4. Analysis  
 
    A cursory inspection of the two frameworks shows a 
clear connection: namely, predictability is mappable to 
transparency, unlinkability is mappable to 
dissasociability, and manageability is mappable to 
intervenability. Predictability and transparency both 
stipulate that the system be understandable and 
predictable from an outsider’s perspective.  
    Unlinkability and dissasociability both require that 
any information used and stored be unconnectable to 
outside information, and both frameworks state that the 
best method to ensure their respective principle is to 
minimize the data collected. Manageability and 
intervenability both state that data should be correctable 
by the proper parties. However, a more thorough 
examination reveals critical differences between the 
two.  
 
A. Predictability versus Transparency 
 
 
Figure 3 – Visual representation of transparent 
systems as a subset of predictable systems 
 
    With regards to predictability and transparency, the 
degree to which a system should be understood from an 
outside perspective is drastically different. 
Predictability is met if “reliable assumptions” can be 
made about the system in question [2]. This does not 
implicitly mean that data subjects and stakeholders 
know how the data is being used, but rather that 
subjects and stakeholders are not surprised by the way 
data is used. Transparency, on the other hand, requires 
that any data processing system should be 
understandable and reconstructable at any given time 
[43].  
    To put it another way, predictable systems are black 
boxes: if one puts information in, the outcome of that 
data entry is predictable by data subjects and 
shareholders alike. Transparent systems are essentially 
white boxes: while the ULD make no specific mention 
to a complete understanding of the system’s technical 
details, the fact that all transparent systems must be 
reproducible implies a degree of system visibility far 
exceeding the requirements of predictable systems. 
Following this comparison, one could state that 
transparent systems are a subset of predictable systems.  
    Additionally, transparency requires that a multitude 
of contexts regarding the system in question be 
understandable and reconstructable, “including the 
legal, technical, and organization setting” [43]. 
Predictability makes no such mention of the context in 
which the system is used. Once again, this lends 
credence to the idea that predictable systems are a 
subset of transparent systems. While the technical 
capabilities of the system must be made apparent to 
users in a predictable system, the context in which the 
system is used need not be made apparent.  
    As an example, say a company collected, stored, and 
processed PII. This company states that the system they 
use gathers user-submitted data, stores it in on-site 
servers, and then uses that information to better tailor 
the services they provide to the individual user. What 
they do not mention is that they tailor their services by 
sharing this information to a politically affiliated 
association which then uses that information to target 
users with political advertisements. This system would 
be a predictable one, but not a transparent one.  
    It is technically true that the information is used to 
tailor the services the company provides to the 
individual user, and it does so is an unsurprising way. 
However, a transparent system would be required to 
state how the information is used specifically as part of 
its privacy notice: In this case, not disclosing that 
personal data would be used for targeted advertising is 
a privacy-relevant detail in the organizational setting 
context. Since it wasn’t disclosed beforehand (and 
hence the data processing wasn’t understood “at any 
time” as per ULD), it is a violation of the transparency 
protection goal.  
    When it comes to implementing one of these two 
objectives into a data processing system, both have 
their pros and cons. As may be obvious, transparency is 
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stricter than predictability, and it is therefore more 
costly to implement in terms of energy, time, and 
money. However, one could see the choice as the 
difference between a system that your customers can 
trust and a system that your customers can understand. 
In many ways, this makes transparency the superior 
choice to predictability, as it can help sow good will 
that may or may not be available in a predictable 
system.  
    The managerial implications of these two objectives 
also highlight a key difference between the 
philosophies that motivated the development of these 
two partial ontologies. NISTIR 8062 is a government 
document meant to provide “future guidance on how 
federal agencies will be able to incorporate privacy as 
an attribute of trustworthy systems through the 
management of privacy as a collaborative, 
interdisciplinary engineering practice” [2]. By 
comparison, “Protection Goals for Privacy 
Engineering” states “The intention of this paper is to 
give an overview and some pointers to ongoing 
research in this area” [43]. It is, then, only natural for 
the NIST objective to choose a more cost-effective 
solution, while the ULD pushed the idea of 
predictability and similar concepts to their logical 
conclusions.  
 
B. Manageability versus Intervenability  
 
 
Figure 4 – Visual representation of 
intervenable systems as a subset of 
manageable systems 
 
    With regards to manageability and intervenability, 
once again it appears that the ULD framework is more 
restrictive than the NIST framework. Intervenability 
requires that data subjects be able to intervene during 
data processing and ensure that they are able to correct 
and erase data, withdraw consent to data collection and 
processing, and lodge claims and raise disputes to 
remedy wrongful uses of data [43]. By contrast, NIST 
explicitly states that “manageability is not a policy 
statement about whether individuals should have the 
right to control their information” [2].  
    To better visualize this comparison, consider a data 
broker. A data broker embracing intervenability would 
allow for complete modification and deletion of the 
data belonging to a data subject. If this data broker, 
alternatively, embraced manageability, the system 
could then be developed such that only internal staff 
could granularly perform administrative actions on the 
data.  
    If the system implements a way to modify data 
(given proper authorization), then the system would 
still “[provide] the capability for granular 
administration of PII including alteration, deletion, and 
selective disclosure” [2] thereby meeting the goal of 
manageability. Full intervenability requires that any 
subject whose data is stored in the system be able to 
modify that data, while manageability only requires 
that some qualified authority be able to do so.  
    When choosing between manageability and 
intervenability, one should first consider the nature of 
the data being processed and the way in which that data 
is used. If the data are going to change rapidly then 
consider intervenability. Should the data instead be 
relatively stable or if the data are highly sensitive and 
changes to the datum could result in drastic changes to 
how that datum is handled, consider manageability. 
Ultimately, one should consider how the data are likely 
to change over the course of its use and who should be 
able to correct and remove said data. 
 
C. Disassociability versus Unlinkability  
 
 
Figure 5 – Visual representation of 
disassociability and unlinkability 
 
    The differences between dissasociability and 
unlinkability are more subtle than in the other two 
comparisons. That is to say, there are very few actual 
differences between the two privacy goals. The two 
goals attempt to, in the words of NIST, “actively 
[protect] or [“blind”] an individual’s identity or 
associated activities from exposure” [2] and require 
that system developers carefully consider the potential 
damages that could occur as a result of data exposure.  
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    The confusing aspect of this, however, is the way in 
which the ULD defines unlinkability. In accordance 
with its name, unlinkability “is defined as the property 
that privacy-relevant data cannot be linked across 
domains that are constituted by a common purpose and 
context” [43]. This definition requires a careful 
consideration of what data is used and how that data is 
stored with the end goal of a data set that is unlinkable 
to domains and contexts outside of the current domain.  
    The keyword, for this comparison, is domain. One 
could make the argument that the use of this word 
implies that the data used should be linkable to similar 
domains outside of the data system itself. However, this 
contradicts the ULD’s statement saying that their 
definition of unlinkability encompasses the concepts of 
data minimization and anonymity. Assuming that any 
interpretation of a definition that contradicts that 
definition is invalid, this means that unlinkability 
would not allow this linkability.  
    Thus, the major difference between the two 
definitions, the use of the term domain, is negligible. 
This implies that the two have goals so similar that they 
are practically indistinguishable from each other. 
Further analysis of these two privacy goals may reveal 
some subtle differences beyond the scope of this 
discussion, but for the purposes of this discussion, the 
two are the same concept said with slightly different 
words. 
 
D. Holistic Comparisons 
 
    When taken as a whole, both frameworks call for 
some degree of security, anonymity, transparency, and 
data controllability. Both frameworks bring attention to 
the importance of the CIA triad, with NIST stating that 
the triad is the set of objectives by which systems meet 
the FIPP of Security and the ULD incorporating 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability into the Six-
Pointed Star. Although they differ in subtle ways, each 
of the objectives have similar goals when compared to 
their counterpart in the other framework, as elaborated 
on at the start of section III.  
    The two frameworks also differ in structure. While 
the NIST framework’s objectives are intended to be the 
CIA triad of privacy, the ULD triad is more than a 
triad. The Six-Pointed Star that transparency, 
unlinkability, and intervenability come from is a set of 
axes showing what a system prioritizes.  
    Given the relationships between the two goals, it is 
safe to say that the ULD triad focuses on defining the 
highest possible standards to which data processors 
must be held, while NIST’s triad focuses more on the 
practical implementation of data privacy safeguards.  
    Put another way, one could say that the three 
objectives of the NIST triad are goals that are capable 
of defining how well a system supports the privacy 
policies of an organization while the Six-Pointed Star 
assumes that some kind of balance between security, 
privacy, and goals within security and privacy will 
always be reached by data systems and provides a way 
of visualizing and measuring the tradeoffs made during 
the system’s development. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
    Privacy is a complex topic that is enjoying more and 
more research and development in recent years. As part 
of this research, frameworks that are useful in 
analyzing information system privacy goals and 
objectives are a natural development. By comparing 
these frameworks, subtle differences related to the 
extent to which each part of the framework accurately 
measures privacy and the components of privacy each 
framework part attempts to address emerge. In this 
comparison, it is clear that the intent behind the 
framework influences its design.  
    As the preceding analysis shows, the Six-Pointed 
Star developed by the ULD has much stricter 
requirements regarding what must be done to safeguard 
the privacy of data subjects. Both transparency and 
intervenability define systems that form a proper subset 
of systems within systems defined by their NIST 
counterparts: predictability and manageability. By 
comparison, NIST-defined systems are generally easier 
to implement: the cost of turning a predictable system 
into a transparent one tends to be non-trivial, for 
example.  
    Given the two different goals found in the holistic 
comparisons between the two, it is difficult to say 
which is objectively superior as each framework has a 
set of goals that are not directly compatible with each 
other. While many ideas are represented in both 
frameworks, the differences in practicality, usability, 
strictness, and intent make the two too distinct to 
directly compare their quality. Neither framework, 
then, is inherently superior to the other in all scenarios.  
    However, the framework proposed by the ULD 
would make a stronger starting point for the definition 
of data privacy because of its focus on defining the 
highest possible standards that data processing 
organizations must follow. A universal definition for 
data privacy must be as all-encompassing as is possible, 
and the practical implementation focus of NIST’s 
framework, while important for the implementation of 
data privacy, was found to be less restrictive 
comparatively. However, the ULD standard is 
incomplete because it does not take into account 
compromises which are necessary if the definition is to 
be used in the future. That is to say, while the ULD 
standard is a better basis for a future definition, it must 
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be expanded to include the considerations included in 
the NIST framework. 
 
6. Recommendations and Future Work 
 
    Given that the Six-Pointed Star is the stronger 
starting point for a universal definition of data privacy, 
future work expanding on this comparison should 
center around enhancing the ULD framework to 
mitigate its weaknesses with regards to the 
implementation of its objectives. 
    The two triads used in this analysis are not 
universally accepted as definitive and comprehensive 
definitions of data privacy, as evidenced by the 
numerous other frameworks that have been developed. 
In future research, comparisons between the 
frameworks used in this analysis and other data privacy 
frameworks and any potential triads such as the EU’s 
GDPR, APEC’s Privacy Framework, and Google’s 
Framework for Responsible Data Protection [45]; [46]; 
[47] should be performed. Additionally, this research 
will help to pave the way for a universal definition of 
data privacy and an accepted set of principle 
components of data privacy.   
    Given the fact that these frameworks were defined by 
different countries, future research should also be 
performed to determine the differing notions, goals, and 
intentions that lead to the development of data privacy 
frameworks in different countries and cultures. 
Building on this idea, any research into currently 
enacted privacy laws or regulations would be 
invaluable towards reaching a common data privacy 
triad.  
    Finally, as this comparison is relatively shallow with 
regards to the full reports that define these privacy 
triads, a deeper dive into the way in which these 
privacy triads are to be implemented or an exhaustive 
comparison and analysis between the two frameworks 
as a whole would be useful for future discussions.   
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